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Reserving the Right: Does a Constitutional Marriage
Amendment Necessarily Trump an Earlier and More
General Equal Protection or Privacy Provision?
R. Stephen Painter, Jr. ∗
Efforts to amend constitutions at both the state and federal
level have proliferated since the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts declared in its 2003 Goodridge v. Department of Public
1
Health decision that the exclusion of lesbians and gay men from the
benefits and protections of marriage is “incompatible with the
constitutional principles of respect for individual autonomy and
2
equality under law.” In the two years following Goodridge, three other
lower court judges, in California, New York, and Washington, have
ruled that those state constitutions likewise guarantee same-sex
3
couples the right to marry. Responding to the recent lesbian and
gay victories in state court, opponents of same-sex marriage have
successfully lobbied fourteen states to adopt state constitutional
4
5
amendments that prohibit same-sex marriage. Four other states
∗

Attorney, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, B.A. 1996, J.D. 2001,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The views expressed herein are my own
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or its staff. I would like to
thank Jesse Christensen, Leslie Hickman Loucks, and David Smyth for their very
thoughtful comments on prior drafts of this Article.
1
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
2
Id. at 941.
3
Hernandez v. Robles, 794 N.Y.S.2d 579 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005); Woo v. Lockyer,
No. 4365 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 13, 2005), available at http://www.sftc.org/Docs/
Marriage%20Final%20Decision.pdf; Anderson v. Kings County, No. 04-2-04964-4SEA, 2004 WL 1738447 (Wash. Super. Aug. 4, 2004).
4
Louisiana and Missouri adopted marriage amendments early in 2004.
LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15 (adopted Sept. 18, 2004); MO. CONST. art. I, § 33 (adopted
Aug. 3, 2004). Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah adopted marriage amendments on
November 2, 2004. ARK. CONST. amend. 83; GA. CONST. art. I, § IV; KY. CONST.
§ 233a; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25; MISS. CONST. art. 14, § 263A; MONT. CONST. art. XIII,
§ 7; N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28; OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35;
OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29. Kansas adopted its marriage
amendment on April 5, 2005. KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 16(a).
5
The four states that adopted marriage amendments before Goodridge were
Alaska, Hawaii, Nebraska, and Nevada. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25; HAW. CONST.
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6

adopted marriage amendments prior to Goodridge, but subsequent to
similar judicial decisions holding that the Hawaii and Alaska same-sex
marriage prohibitions violated state constitutional equal protection
7
and privacy guarantees. In addition to the eighteen states that have
already adopted marriage amendments, several others are
8
considering it. Calls for a constitutional response to the judicial
articulation of marriage rights have not been limited to the state
context. President George W. Bush has advocated strongly for an
amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would define marriage in
9
exclusively heterosexual terms.
These state marriage amendments present the potential for at
least a latent tension with those states’ constitutional equal protection
or privacy guarantees. In the case of Alaska and Hawaii, the conflict
10
was patent: the marriage amendments prohibiting same-sex marriage
followed court cases in both those states holding that the privacy and
art. I, § 23; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 21. Nevada’s marriage
amendment was struck by a federal district court as violative of the U.S. Constitution,
but the decision will almost certainly be appealed to the Eighth Circuit. See Citizens
for Equal Protection, Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Neb. 2005).
6
Throughout this Article, I refer to state and federal amendments that define
marriage in exclusively heterosexual terms or that prohibit same-sex marriage as
“marriage amendments.” While I recognize that these amendments might just as
well be termed “heterosexual marriage amendments” or “anti-same-sex marriage
amendments,” I opt for “marriage amendments” for simplicity’s sake.
7
In its consideration of the Hawaii same-sex marriage prohibition, the Hawaii
Supreme Court held that the marriage prohibition constituted a gender-based
classification and remanded to the lower court to determine whether the state had a
compelling interest in prohibiting same-sex marriage. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44,
64–67 (Haw. 1993); see also Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians
and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994) (discussing in detail
the claim that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is gender-based
discrimination). Three years later, the trial court determined that the state did not
have a compelling interest justifying its same-sex marriage prohibition. Baehr v.
Miike, No. CIV 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, *20-21 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
In Alaska, a lower court judge declared same-sex marriage a fundamental right
under the state constitution’s privacy provision. See Brause v. Bureau of Vital
Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743, *5–6 (Alaska Super. Ct.
Feb. 27, 1998).
8
Alabama, California, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin all
may be considering marriage amendments. See Kavan Peterson, Same-sex unions—a
constitutional race, STATELINE, Sep. 8, 2005, http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.a
ction?siteNodeId=136&languageId=1&contentId=20695; Cheryl Wetzstein, States
Lining up to Outlaw Same-sex ‘Marriage’, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2004, at A3.
9
George W. Bush, President of the United States of America, President Calls for
Constitutional Amendment Protecting Marriage (Feb. 24, 2004), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040224-2.html.
10
As it will be in Massachusetts, or Washington, for example, if they ultimately
ratify their own marriage amendments.
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equal protection provisions, respectively, constitutionally required that
11
same-sex couples be permitted to marry.
For many, this constitutional conflict is really no conflict at all.
After all, it is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that
when two provisions speak to the same subject, the later and more
specific provision governs over the earlier and more general
12
provision.
Not surprisingly, this canon of construction has been
13
For
described as axiomatic in the constitutional context as well.
example, both the Hawaii and Alaska courts assumed, with little
comment, that those states’ marriage amendments simply mooted gay
and lesbian claims to marriage under the equal protection and
14
privacy provisions. Because the marriage amendment and the equal
11

See Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *5–6; Baehr, 1996 WL 694235, at *19–21.
2B NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 51.02, at 186–
87 (6th ed. 2000) (“Where two statutes are involved each of which by its terms
applies to the facts before the court, the statute which is the more recent of the two
irreconcilably conflicting statutes prevails. . . . Where a conflict exists the more
specific statute controls over the more general one.”). Although this might be an
articulation of two separate canons—that is, the canon that later provisions govern
over earlier and the canon that specific provisions govern over more general—when
I refer throughout this Article to “the” statutory canon, I mean a composite rule of
construction that a later and more specific provision governs over a conflicting
earlier and more general provision.
13
16 AM. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 63 (2004) (“[I]f there is a conflict between a
general and a special or specific provision in a constitution, the special or specific
provision must prevail in respect of its subject matter. . . . If there is a real
inconsistency between a constitutional amendment and an antecedent provision, the
amendment must prevail because it is the latest expression of the will of the
people.”). See also Bess v. Ulmer, 985 P.2d 979, 988 n.57 (Alaska 1999) (striking
language from the proposed Alaska marriage amendment that “[n]o provision of
this constitution may be interpreted to require the State to recognize or permit
marriage between individuals of the same sex” and remarking that “[t]he objective of
the second sentence—harmonization of other provisions of the constitution with the
meaning of the first sentence—will be achieved in any event, for a specific
amendment controls other more general provisions with which it might conflict”).
14
See Brause v. Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 21 P.3d 357, 358 (Alaska 2001)
(dismissing a constitutional challenge to the same-sex marriage prohibition because
the challenge was effectively mooted by the passage of the marriage amendment).
Likewise, the Hawaii court dismissed a constitutional challenge to the same-sex
marriage prohibition, commenting that “[t]he marriage amendment validated [the
gender restriction in Hawaii’s marriage statute] by taking the statute out of the ambit
of the equal protection clause.” Baehr v. Miike, No. 20371, 1999 Haw. LEXIS 391, at
*6 (Haw. Dec. 9, 1999). The Hawaii court’s assumption that the marriage
amendment removed the marriage prohibition from the ambit of the equal
protection clause is striking, given the considerable legislative ambiguity on precisely
this point. See infra note 111 for a discussion of the legislative history surrounding
the passage of Hawaii’s marriage amendment.
Commentators on the Hawaii and Alaska amendments generally agreed that the
amendments effectively mooted efforts to secure same-sex marriage under the states’
equal protection or privacy provisions. E.g., Sam Howe Verhovek, The 1998 Elections:
12
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protection or privacy provision both speak to the same subject, the
later and more specific marriage amendment was assumed
automatically to trump the earlier and more general equal protection
or privacy provision.
This Article examines whether there are other ways to
approach a constitution that contains two conflicting provisions—a
marriage amendment prohibiting same-sex marriage and an equality
15
or privacy provision that has been or could be broadly construed as
16
guaranteeing marriage rights for same-sex couples.
Must the
marriage amendment be interpreted as carving same-sex marriage
from the ambit of a constitution’s privacy or equal protection
provisions? This Article suggests that the answer to this question
should not be so simple, and certainly not as simple as the Hawaii
and Alaska decisions suggest.
I do not argue that state or federal marriage amendments are
themselves unconstitutional in light of equal protection or privacy
17
guarantees found elsewhere in the constitution.
Rather, I argue
The States – Initiatives, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1998, at B1 (“Hawaii voters gave the
Legislature authorization to overturn a court ruling and ban same-sex marriages.”);
Elaine Herscher, Same-Sex Marriage Suffers Setback: Alaska, Hawaii Voters Say “ No”, S.F.
CHRON., Nov. 5, 1998, at A2 (discussing the amendment as barring marriage but
allowing for the possibility that the state supreme court might constitutionally
mandate the benefits of marriage); Final Election Results: Colorado Through Illinois, USA
TODAY, Nov. 5, 1998, at 6A (“Supporters successfully headed off a state Supreme
Court ruling that could legalize same-sex marriages.”); Carole Migden, Challenge Faces
the Gay Community, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 22, 1998, at A23 (“Voters in both Hawaii and
Alaska recently approved initiatives by a 2 to 1 margin to ban same-sex marriages,
rendering moot any court action on the matter.”).
15
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court struck state laws criminalizing certain sexual
conduct between same-sex partners under the Due Process Clause, not as violating a
right to privacy, but instead as violating a liberty interest. 539 U.S. 558, 578–79
(2003). See also Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v.
Texas, in CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 2002–2003 21 (James L. Swanson ed., 2003).
I use the term “privacy provision” throughout this Article to include constitutional
provisions that may be interpreted to protect liberty interests.
16
The arguments in this Article are intended to apply to both state and federal
constitutions. Consequently, when I refer to a constitution (as opposed to the
Constitution), I am typically referring to any state or federal constitution that
contains internally conflicting provisions, i.e., a marriage amendment and an equality
or privacy provision. References to the Constitution refer specifically to the United
States Constitution.
17
Others have argued that a constitutional amendment may itself be
unconstitutional by virtue of it contravening certain fundamental constitutional
norms. See, e.g., Charles A. Kelbley, Are There Limits to Constitutional Change? Rawls on
Comprehensive Doctrines, Unconstitutional Amendments, and the Basis of Equality, 72
FORDHAM L. REV. 1487 (2004) (expounding on theoretical limitations on
constitutional amendments grounded in Rawlsian theories of justice and equality);
Walter F. Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 703 (1980)

PAINTER FINAL.DOC

2005]

10/12/2005 5:57:03 PM

RESERVING THE RIGHT

129

that the statutory canon of construction—that a later and more
specific provision governs over an earlier and more general
provision—is an uneasy fit in the constitutional context. Because the
intuition that a marriage amendment automatically trumps an equal
protection or privacy provision is largely guided by the intuitive
applicability of the canon, it follows that if our canon of construction
is suspect in the constitutional context, so ought be our presumption
that the marriage amendment ipso facto governs.
Part I of this Article suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court’s
Twenty-first Amendment cases can fairly be read as a model for
abandoning the statutory canon in the constitutional context.
Instead of employing the canon in its Twenty-first Amendment cases,
the Supreme Court has instead articulated an approach in these
liquor cases that involves weighing the constitutional interests at stake
in any given case in which a later and more specific provision
conflicts with an earlier and more general provision. Part II offers a
second reason for suspecting that the canon of statutory construction
is an inappropriate tool for at least certain constitutional provisions—
namely that some constitutional provisions are, properly conceived,
atemporal. For these provisions, it makes little sense to view one
provision as governing over another by virtue of it being the “later”
provision. Although Parts I and II offer some judicial precedent and
theoretical basis for dispensing with the canon of construction in the
constitutional context, they do not on their own suggest that a judge
in fact should make the interpretive choice to reject the canon when
considering conflicting constitutional mandates relating to same-sex
marriage. Part III picks up where Parts I and II leave off by providing
a normative framework for considering when a judge should reject
the canon. Specifically, I argue that, for reasons of constitutional
legitimacy, it may be altogether desirable at some point in the future
for a judge to follow the Supreme Court’s Twenty-first Amendment
model and reject the statutory canon of construction in the marriage
context. In other words, to avoid undermining the legitimacy of state
and federal constitutions that contain marriage amendments, or
more properly, our collective faith in the authority of our
constitutions, a judge might plausibly weigh the constitutional
interests at stake in any given case and interpret the earlier and more

(arguing that an amendment might be invalid if it contravenes certain basic notions
of human dignity); Jeff Rosen, Note, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Constitutional?,
100 YALE L.J. 1073 (1991) (arguing that the flag burning amendment would have
been unconstitutional as contravening natural law principles enforceable under the
Ninth Amendment).

PAINTER FINAL.DOC

130

10/12/2005 5:57:03 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:125

general constitutional principle of equality or privacy as ultimately
governing over the marriage question.
I
Although the statutory canon of construction—that later and
more specific provisions govern over earlier and more general
provisions—has often been invoked in the constitutional context, the
U.S. Supreme Court’s modern Twenty-first Amendment cases can be
read as a model for rejecting the canon in the constitutional context.
In offering alternatives to the statutory approach, the Court’s liquor
cases illuminate the range of interpretive choices available to a judge
when resolving a tension between a marriage amendment and an
equal protection or privacy provision. To write, as it did, without any
discussion at all, that the Hawaii marriage amendment removed the
same-sex marriage prohibition from the ambit of the state equal
protection clause, the Hawaii Supreme Court obscured that range of
18
To put it differently, the view that
interpretive possibilities.
marriage amendments trump other more general equality or privacy
provisions is one interpretive choice, but not the only plausible
choice.
A. The Twenty-first Amendment v. the Commerce Clause
Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment, the constitutional
amendment repealing Prohibition, provides an interesting case study
for exploring the interpretive possibilities open to a judge
considering a later and more specific constitutional provision that
conflicts with an earlier and more general provision. Section 2
provides that, “[t]he transportation or importation into any State,
Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use
therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is
19
A plain language reading appears to
hereby prohibited.”
constitutionally validate any state law relating to the transportation or
importation of liquor into that state. The Commerce Clause, on the
other hand, drafted some 150 years before the Twenty-first
Amendment, has been interpreted to place certain restrictions on the
states’ authority to pass laws that burden interstate commerce. The
Commerce Clause provides that Congress shall have the power “[t]o

18
19

See Baehr, 1999 Haw. LEXIS 391, at *6.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
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regulate Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
20
States, and with the Indian Tribes.”
Any prohibition on states’ ability to regulate interstate
commerce, however, is not contained in the plain text of the
Commerce Clause, but is instead inferred by negative implication.
Under the so-called dormant Commerce Clause, states are not
permitted to regulate interstate commerce because “when a State
proceeds to regulate commerce . . . among the several states, it is
exercising the very power that is granted to Congress, and is doing
21
the very thing which Congress is authorized to do.” Without any
express textual authority, then, “the doctrine [is] that the commerce
clause, by its own force and without natural legislation, puts it into
22
the power of the Court to place limits on state authority.”
How, then, should a court resolve a dormant Commerce
Clause challenge to a state law that regulates the importation or
transportation of liquor into that state? Should the state law be
stricken as violative of the dormant Commerce Clause, or has the
state regulation been “saved” by Section 2 of the Twenty-first
Amendment? One might plausibly argue that the canons of statutory
construction easily resolve any conflict between the two constitutional
provisions. Section 2 by its terms prohibits the violation of state
importation and transportation laws relating to liquor. As the later
amendment that deals specifically with state regulation of liquor,
Section 2 should be regarded as the clearest and latest expression of
constitutional intent with respect to the validity of state attempts to
regulate interstate commerce in liquor.
Indeed, until the mid-1960s, this was precisely the Supreme
Court’s approach to Section 2 and the dormant Commerce Clause.
The Court viewed Section 2 as granting states authority “to legislate
concerning intoxicating liquors brought from without, unfettered by the
23
Commerce Clause.”
Just three years after the ratification of the
Twenty-first Amendment, the Court in State Board of Equalization v.
24
Young’s Market Co. upheld a state statute imposing a licensing fee to
import beer into its borders, a fee that according to the Court would
have been unquestionably unconstitutional as a direct burden on
interstate commerce, were it not for the plain language of Section 2
20

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
22
FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY & WAITE
18 (1937).
23
Ziffrin v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939) (emphasis added).
24
299 U.S. 59, 62 (1936).
21
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25

of the Twenty-first Amendment.
Justice Brandeis’ language in
Young’s Market explains the Court’s early view of the relationship
between Section 2 and the dormant Commerce Clause:
The words used [in Section 2] are apt to confer upon the state
the power to forbid all importations which do not comply with the
conditions which it prescribes. The plaintiffs ask us to limit this
broad command. They request us to construe the amendment as
saying, in effect: The state may prohibit the importation of
intoxicating liquors provided it prohibits the manufacture and
sale within its borders; but if it permits such manufacture and
sale, it must let imported liquors compete with the domestic on
equal terms. To say that, would involve not a construction of the
26
amendment, but a rewriting of it.

Three years later, in Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control
27
Commission, the Court similarly upheld another state law that
discriminated against certain liquor imports, clarifying that “the right
of a state to prohibit or regulate the importation of intoxicating
28
Although not
liquor is not limited by the commerce clause.”
expressly invoking the statutory canons of construction, the Court’s
early approach in Young’s Market and Indianapolis Brewing is consistent
with the view that Section 2, as the later and more specific
constitutional provision, should govern over any question concerning
the constitutionality of state liquor import laws.
But the Court signaled a change in its approach to Section 2
beginning with its 1964 case, Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor
29
Corp., in which the Court considered a challenge to the New York
State Liquor Authority’s prohibition on the sale of bottled wines and
liquors to international travelers at John F. Kennedy International
30
Airport. The Court departed from its previous holdings that the
Twenty-first Amendment removes from the ambit of the Commerce
Clause all state regulation of the importation or transportation of
liquor. Instead, the Court indicated that “[t]o draw a conclusion
from [the previous] line of decisions that the Twenty-first
Amendment has somehow operated to ‘repeal’ the Commerce Clause
25

Id. at 62.
Id.
27
305 U.S. 391 (1939).
28
Id. at 394; see also Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401, 403 (1938)
(holding that the rule that “discrimination against imported liquor is permissible
although it is not an incident of reasonable regulation of the liquor traffic, was
settled by [Young’s Market]”).
29
377 U.S. 324 (1964).
30
Id. at 326–27.
26
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wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors is concerned would . . . be
31
Rather, “[b]oth the Twenty-first
an absurd oversimplification.”
Amendment and the Commerce Clause are parts of the same
constitution. Like other provisions of the Constitution, each must be
considered in the light of the other, and in the context of the issues and
32
interests at stake in any concrete case.”
The Court has since characterized its approach in Hostetter as a
33
“pragmatic effort to harmonize state and federal powers.” As the
34
Court explained in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, where it struck
a state excise tax discriminating against imported liquor, the
courts must determine in any concrete case “whether the
principles underlying the Twenty-first Amendment are sufficiently
implicated . . . to outweigh the Commerce Clause principles that
35
By espousing this balancing of
would otherwise be offended.”
constitutional interests, the Court in Bacchus Imports directly rejected
its earlier approach in Young’s Market, in which the Court held that
Section 2 expressly permits a state to discriminate against out-of-state
liquor—even though such discrimination would otherwise have been
36
forbidden by the dormant Commerce Clause. In essence, then, the
Court rejected its earlier approach to Section 2 that was consistent
with the statutory canon (i.e., Section 2, as the later and more specific
provision, governs) and suggested instead that Section 2 and
31

Id. at 331–32.
Id. at 332 (emphasis added). Justice Stevens has criticized the Court’s
subsequent understanding of this language in Hostetter as qualifying the Court’s
earlier holdings that the Twenty-first Amendment leaves state regulation of liquor
unfettered by the dormant Commerce Clause. Rather, in Justice Stevens’ view, by
indicating that the earlier precedents do not establish that the “Twenty-first
Amendment has somehow operated to ‘repeal’ the Commerce Clause,” the Court in
Hostetter was discussing Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, not state power
under the dormant Commerce Clause. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S.
263, 283–84 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). And in any event, in Justice Stevens’
view, this language in Hostetter is dicta because the case was decided on other
grounds: the Twenty-first Amendment had already been construed as leaving
undisturbed Commerce Clause constraints with regard to liquor shipped through,
rather than to, a state. Carter v. Virginia, 321 U.S. 131, 137 (1944). Because the
Twenty-first Amendment was not implicated by a shipment through the state (the
liquor in Hostetter was ultimately shipped out of the country), it was unnecessary to
pronounce on the relationship between Section 2 and the Commerce Clause.
Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 284 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
33
Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 109
(1980).
34
Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. 263.
35
Id. at 275–76; see also Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 714
(1984).
36
See supra notes 23–28 and accompanying text.
32

PAINTER FINAL.DOC

134

10/12/2005 5:57:03 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:125

Commerce Clause constitutional interests should be balanced. And
although consistently purporting to embrace its earlier holdings that
37
Section 2 grants the states broad regulatory authority over liquor, in
this balancing of constitutional interests, the Court has nearly always
favored the federal interests embodied in the Commerce Clause over
38
the state interests embodied in Section 2.
I interpret Bacchus Imports as the culmination of the Court’s
post-Hostetter approach that Section 2 and Commerce Clause interests
should be weighed in any given case. Bacchus Imports is significant
precisely because it rejects the Court’s earlier approach to Section
2—an approach that had viewed Section 2, the later and more
specific constitutional provision, as controlling in the liquor
commerce context.
Recently, however, the Supreme Court has attempted to
recontextualize its holding in Bacchus Imports, not as rejecting the
statutory canon, but instead as construing Section 2 and the dormant
Commerce Clause harmoniously—a reading purportedly grounded
in the history of Section 2 and the pre-Prohibition Wilson and Webb39
Kenyon Acts. On this reading, because the text of Section 2 closely
tracks the language of the Webb-Kenyon Act, legislation that was
intended to permit dry states to prohibit liquor imports, the intent of
Section 2 must have been similar: primarily to restore to dry states
after repeal the same authority to forbid liquor imports they enjoyed
pre-Prohibition. For advocates of this reading of Section 2, the
provision simply constitutionalized the pre-Prohibition state police
power over liquor as reflected in the Webb-Kenyon Act, which in turn
ostensibly codified the police power as reflected in the Wilson Act—a
police power that included the right to ban, but not discriminate

37

See infra note 45.
The Court, for example, has stricken state price affirmation statutes, which
typically require that in-state prices of liquor not exceed prices charged out of state.
Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324 (1989); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State
Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986). And weighing constitutional values, not with
regard to the dormant Commerce Clause, but instead with regard to Congress’s
positive Commerce Clause powers, the Court has also favored federal interests over
the state interests embodied in Section 2. E.g., 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S.
335 (1987) (invalidating a state liquor law that conflicted with provisions of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act); Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n, 445 U.S. 97 (1980) (same).
But see North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423 (1990) (holding that a state
liquor regulation impacting federal law with respect to procurement of liquor on
federal military bases did not violate the Supremacy Clause, with only Justice Scalia
arguing in a concurring opinion that Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment is
central to the holding that the Supremacy Clause is not violated).
39
See Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005).
38
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40

against, out-of-state liquor. Under this reading, the discriminatory
tax in Bacchus Imports presented no problem at all under Section 2 of
the Twenty-first Amendment because it was precisely this sort of
discriminatory treatment that Section 2 was never intended to cover.
And, to round out the argument, because the statutory canon would
be applicable in Bacchus Imports only if Section 2 and the Commerce
Clause were in conflict, Bacchus Imports ipso facto cannot fairly be
read as rejecting that canon of construction.
The Court’s recent interpretation of Bacchus Imports—that it
reflects a harmonization of Section 2 and the Commerce Clause—
although plausible, is no more plausible than my reading of Bacchus
Imports as recognizing that the constitutional provisions conflict and
then following the earlier and more general of the two. As a
preliminary matter, any explanation of Bacchus Imports based on the
history of Section 2, in turn based on the history of the Webb-Kenyon
41
Act, is spurious.
To be sure, many legislators advocating for the
Twenty-first Amendment probably viewed Section 2 as permitting dry
states to forbid liquor imports and nothing more. Others viewed
Section 2 as allowing even wet states to burden interstate commerce
so long as out-of-state interests were treated exactly the same as instate interests. But there were still others, including many of the most
prominent anti-prohibitionists, who agitated for repeal in large part
40

Before 1900, the Supreme Court frustrated state prohibition by holding under
the dormant Commerce Clause that dry states were not permitted to ban liquor
imports. See Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890). Reacting to Leisy, Congress
enacted the Wilson Act, which was intended to allow dry states authority to forbid
liquor imports. 26 Stat. 313 (1890). The Wilson Act, by its terms, allowed states to
regulate imported liquor “to the same extent and in the same manner as though
such liquids or liquors had been produced in such State or Territory.” Id. The
Supreme Court subsequently upheld the Wilson Act, but again frustrated state
prohibition by narrowly construing the Act as not permitting a state to forbid
interstate shipments directly to consumers. E.g., Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412 (1898).
Congress reacted again to protect dry states’ right to prohibit liquor by enacting the
Webb-Kenyon Act, which prohibited the shipment of liquor into a state in violation
of any state law. 37 Stat. 699 (1913).
There is disagreement as to whether the Webb-Kenyon Act should be
interpreted as incorporating the Wilson Act’s rule that a state may not discriminate
against out-of-state liquor. A majority on the Supreme Court very recently adopted
this view. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1901; see also Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227
F.3d 848, 853 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Like the Wilson Act and the Webb-Kenyon Act before
Prohibition, § 2 enables a state to do to importation of liquor . . . what it chooses to
do to internal sales of liquor, but nothing more.”). Others, however, including Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens, Justice O’Connor, and Justice Thomas, view the
plain language and history of Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment and the
Webb-Kenyon Act as expressly permitting states to discriminate against out-of-state
liquor. See Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1919 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
41
See supra note 40.
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because they believed the federal government had dramatically
overreached during Prohibition; federal involvement in liquor
regulation after 1919 had, in their view, trampled state police power,
bred government corruption, and resulted in widespread contempt
42
for the law. To many of these anti-prohibitionists, Section 2 might
well have been taken at face value: as returning to the states absolute
control over liquor imports, including a right to discriminate against
43
out-of-state interests. And, indeed, to the extent that Section 2 was
intended to return absolute control to the states, Section 2 and the
dormant Commerce Clause would have been in direct conflict in
Bacchus Imports (and the case could consequently be read as rejecting
the statutory canon). But to rely on isolated statements of federal
44
legislators or the similarity between Section 2 and the Webb-Kenyon
42

For a well-documented discussion of the many motivations behind the repeal
movement, see DAVID E. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIBITION 197–99 (2d ed.
2000).
43
Professor Brannon P. Denning has collected a number of contemporary
newspaper accounts illustrating that the debate over Section 2 of the Twenty-first
Amendment was largely between those advocating for federal supervision over liquor
and those advocating for state control of liquor without federal limitation. Brannon P.
Denning, Smokey and the Bandit in Cyberspace: The Dormant Commerce Clause, the Twentyfirst Amendment, and State Regulation of Internet Alcohol Sales, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 297,
308 n.51 (2002).
Justice O’Connor has similarly argued that Section 2 returned “absolute control
of the liquor trade to the states” without federal interference. 324 Liquor Corp., 479
U.S. at 356 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). As proposed originally, the Twenty-first
Amendment contained a Section 3, which granted the federal government
concurrent authority over some aspects of commerce in liquor. That provision was
rejected, in Justice O’Connor’s view, because it was perceived as undermining the
absolute control of liquor commerce vested in the states by Section 2. See id. at 354–
55 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1909 (Stevens J.,
dissenting) (“The notion that discriminating state laws violated the unwritten
prohibition against balkanizing the American economy—while persuasive in
contemporary times when alcohol is viewed as an ordinary article of commerce—
would have seemed strange indeed to the millions of Americans who condemned the
use of the ‘demon rum’ in the 1920’s and 1930’s.”).
44
As the Court has observed, the history of Section 2 is ambiguous in part
because the same legislators often said contradictory things about the provision,
some comments suggesting a narrow reading of the state power contemplated by the
provision and others a broad reading. See 324 Liquor Corp., 479 U.S. at 347 n.10
(noting the conflicting remarks of Senator John James Blaine, the Senate sponsor of
the amendment); see also Duncan Baird Douglass, Note, Constitutional Crossroads:
Reconciling the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause to Evaluate State
Regulation of Interstate Commerce in Alcoholic Beverages, 49 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1631–35
(2000) (discussing the variety of legislative opinions as to the effect of Section 2).
One wonders why so much emphasis is placed on federal legislative intent; at least as
important in determining the purposes of Section 2 (and perhaps illustrative of just
how fictional claims of Section 2’s intent necessarily are) is the intent of the
individual delegates in each of the ratifying state conventions or the intent of the
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Act to suggest that the sole intent of Section 2 was to only minimally
impact the dormant Commerce Clause, neglects the multiplicity of
reasons state and federal lawmakers advocated for repeal.
But even if the question of the single intent of Section 2 is a
coherent one, and even if a thorough examination of the history of
repeal vindicates the narrow interpretation of Section 2, this
historical exegesis was nevertheless not the basis of the Court’s
45
holding at the time it decided Bacchus Imports. In Bacchus Imports,
the Court described the legislative history as “obscur[e],” remarking
that “[n]o clear consensus concerning the meaning of [Section 2] is
46
Despite that lack of consensus, the Court noted that
apparent.”
whatever its purpose, “[t]he central purpose of the provision was not to
empower States to favor local liquor industries by erecting barriers to
47
competition.” And then, following Hostetter, the Court weighed the
state interest (economic protectionism) against the federal interest
people voting for repeal when the issue was put up for popular vote in many of the
states.
45
More importantly, by consistently reiterating that Section 2 grants near plenary
power to the states to regulate liquor commerce, the Court, until Granholm, has
implicitly rejected any view of Section 2 as narrowly drawn. E.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc.
v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 514–16 (1996) (“[T]he text of the Twenty-first
Amendment supports the view that, while it grants the States authority over
commerce that might otherwise be reserved to the Federal Government, it places no
limits whatsoever on other constitutional provisions.”); North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 431
(“[W]ithin the area of its jurisdiction, the State has ‘virtually complete control’ over
the importation and sale of liquor and the structure of the liquor distribution
system” (citing Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 712 (1984), which in
turn relied on Young’s Market for the proposition that Section 2 “reserves to the States
power to impose burdens on interstate commerce in intoxicating liquor that, absent
the Amendment, would clearly be invalid under the Commerce Clause”)); 324 Liquor
Corp., 479 U.S. at 346 (same); see also Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n, 445 U.S.
at 110 (same).
46
Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 274; see also Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n, 445 U.S.
at 107 n.10. The Court advocated the Hostetter balancing of federal and state
interests again in 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, but declined to do so on the basis of the
legislative history of Section 2. 479 U.S. 335, 346–47 (1987) (arguing that the
legislative history is susceptible to both broad and narrow constructions of Section
2). Similarly, holding that the Twenty-first Amendment did not bar application of
the Sherman Act to a state pricing system, the Court in California Retail Liquor Dealers
Ass’n noted the conflicting historical evidence on the purpose of Section 2 and the
lack of consensus in the ratifying state conventions as to its thrust. 445 U.S. at 107.
Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 205–06 (1976) (although the Court noted in dicta
the similarity between Section 2 and the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts, see supra
note 40, and commented on the “framers’ clear intention of constitutionalizing the
Commerce Clause framework established under those statutes,” the Court did not
explain what that framework was, but instead, relying on its older cases, indicated
that “the Amendment primarily created an exception to the normal operation of the
Commerce Clause”).
47
Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 276 (emphasis added).
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(prevention of economic Balkanization). According to the Court,
the federal interest was paramount, but not because Section 2 was, by
48
Indeed, by
its history, inapplicable to discriminatory state laws.
categorizing the empowerment of economic protectionism as not the
central purpose of Section 2, the Court seemed to acknowledge that
Section 2 and the dormant Commerce Clause are in conflict to some
degree with respect to discriminatory liquor laws that have some
economic motivation.
But because there isn’t a traditional
temperance or other classic Section 2 purpose behind the state law,
and because the law violates a central tenet of the dormant Commerce
Clause, the Court considered the federal interests as embodied in the
dormant Commerce Clause controlling over the very weak state
49
Twenty-first Amendment interests. The important point is that the
Court weighed constitutional interests precisely because both Section
2 and the dormant Commerce Clause were thought to apply: the two
provisions were not read harmoniously, and the case can
consequently be read as rejecting the traditional canon of
construction.
Beginning with Hostetter, then, and culminating with its
decision in Bacchus Imports, the Court has consistently advocated a
balancing of state and federal interests when considering conflicts
between Section 2 and the Commerce Clause. This post-Hostetter
balancing is significant in that it seems to abandon the statutory
canon of construction that might otherwise have been thought to
apply, and indeed apparently was applied in Young’s Market, among
others, just after Section 2’s ratification. This split with Young’s Market
is all the more striking in light of the Court’s modern approach,
50
which at least until Granholm v. Heald, has apparently not been
guided by a historical view of Section 2 as largely harmonious with
the dormant Commerce Clause.
Rather, acknowledging the
ambiguous historical record, the Court has consistently favored
federal interests embodied in the earlier and more general dormant
Commerce Clause over the state interests embodied in the later and
more specific language of Section 2. Not surprisingly, the Court’s
48

If the Court were persuaded that Section 2, as a matter of history,
constitutionalized the pre-Prohibition non-discrimination principle ostensibly
codified by the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts, then Section 2 would have been
inapplicable to any discriminatory law, regardless of whether that discrimination was
motivated by economic protectionism, protection of morals, promotion of
temperance, or anything else, thus negating the need to engage in any balancing of
federal and state interests.
49
Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 276.
50
See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text .
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treatment of Section 2, and it’s subordination of that later and more
51
specific amendment to the dictates of the earlier and more general
Commerce Clause, has lead many commentators to suggest that the
Commerce Clause appears to be almost entirely unaffected by the
52
passage of the Twenty-first Amendment.
The Court’s treatment of Section 2 and the dormant Commerce
Clause is indeed instructive for a judge considering the relationship
between a late and specific marriage amendment and an earlier and
more general equal protection or privacy provision. Might the judge
53
not weigh constitutional interests in such a case? Might the judge
not find the interests of equality or autonomy embodied in the
earlier and more general equal protection or privacy provisions

51

The generality of the dormant Commerce Clause cannot be overstated. Not
only does the provision not mention liquor commerce, it does not even mention
state regulation. Putting the point more plainly, considering a challenge to an
Indiana law prohibiting all out-of-state shipments to Indiana consumers, Judge
Easterbrook framed the issue this way: “This case pits the twenty-first amendment,
which appears in the Constitution, against the ‘dormant commerce clause,’ which
does not.” Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 849 (7th Cir. 2000).
52
E.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 349 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(criticizing the Court for allowing the states no more freedom to regulate commerce
in beer than it does commerce in milk notwithstanding the Twenty-first
Amendment); 324 Liquor Corp., 479 U.S. at 352–53 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(observing that “the Court has, over the years, so ‘completely distorted the Twentyfirst Amendment’ that ‘[i]t now has a barely discernible effect in Commerce Clause
cases” (quoting Newport v. Iacobucci, 479 U.S. 92, 98 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting))); Denning, supra note 43, at 299–300 (“That courts continue to construe
narrowly—nearly to the vanishing point—a specific reservation of state power at
federalism’s high tide of judicial enforceability, seems particularly worthy of
attention.”); Douglass, supra note 44, at 1644 (“[N]o state liquor laws are immune
from potential invalidation under the dormant Commerce Clause . . . .”).
53
It might be suggested that the Twenty-first Amendment model is an ill fit in the
marriage amendment context. Abandoning the canon of construction with respect
to Section 2 narrows its operation, but nevertheless leaves something of Section 2
intact. If the canon were abandoned in the marriage amendment context, however,
the marriage amendment would be rendered entirely null. A reading giving effect to
all constitutional language is far preferable to one rendering a portion of the
document a nullity.
As a preliminary matter, the Supreme Court has not always avoided
interpretative strategies that potentially render portions of the Constitution null. See
infra notes 106–11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court’s
endorsement of an interpretation of the Eighth Amendment that would render
portions of the Fifth Amendment a nullity. More importantly, as discussed in Part
III, a court might elect to follow the Twenty-first Amendment model if and when the
legitimacy of a constitution itself is undermined by the continued vitality of a
marriage amendment. In such a case, readings that give effect to the constitution as
a whole are preferable to readings that give effect to each and every one of its
provisions.
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paramount over the interests of defining marriage in exclusively
54
heterosexual terms?
B. The Twenty-first Amendment v. The Import-Export Clause, the First
Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause
On the same day the Court decided Hostetter, the case that
signaled what would become the Court’s eventual abandonment of
55
the statutory canon in Commerce Clause cases, the Court also
considered a challenge to a Kentucky liquor law under the
56
Constitution’s Import-Export Clause. The law at issue in Department
57
of Revenue v. James Beam Distilling Co. prohibited the shipment of
alcohol into Kentucky unless the importer obtained a permit and
58
paid a tax of ten cents on each proof gallon in the shipment.
Striking the Kentucky law as an unconstitutional tax on imports, the

54

The Bacchus Imports model might be particularly relevant not in a marriage
(qua marriage) challenge, but instead an equal protection or due process challenge
to the denial of marriage benefits for same-sex couples. Some commentators have
suggested that the language of the proposed federal marriage amendment, in
addition to prohibiting lesbian or gay marriage, may also deny same-sex couples the
benefits of marriage (as protected by civil unions, domestic partnerships, or other
non-marriage legal arrangements). E.g., Andrew Sullivan, Bush on Gay Marriage:
Uncivil, NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE, July 13, 2004, www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/07/
13/opinion/main629390.shtml; Peterson, supra note 8 (reporting that the marriage
amendments in Arkansas, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan,
Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Utah also ban civil unions or other
partnership benefits). Assuming that a particular marriage amendment would
proscribe both marriage and the benefits of marriage, if a court were to follow
Bacchus Imports in considering a challenge to the denial of marriage benefits, the
court might weigh constitutional interests rather than employ the canon of
construction that would otherwise require following the later and more specific
constitutional provision. Following Bacchus Imports, that court may well find that
although within its language, the denial of civil unions was not a central purpose of the
marriage amendment. And because the equal protection or due process interests
would outweigh those non-core marriage amendment interests, the court may well
elect to follow the earlier and more general equal protection or due process
provision, holding that lesbian and gay couples have a constitutional right to the
benefits of marriage, but not marriage itself.
55
See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text.
56
The Import-Export Clause provides that:
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or
Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary
for executing its inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and
Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of
the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to
the Revision and Controul of the Congress.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
57
377 U.S. 341, 342 (1964).
58
Id. at 342.
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Court held that it “has never so much as intimated that the Twentyfirst Amendment has operated to permit what the Import-Export
59
Clause precisely and explicitly forbids.”
Dissenting, Justice Black criticized both Hostetter and James
Beam Distilling, which held that the Commerce Clause and the
Import-Export Clause, respectively, remained largely undisturbed by
the Twenty-first Amendment. According to Justice Black, the Court
had deprived the states of the power to regulate the liquor business
by taxation or otherwise—a power expressly granted the states by the
60
Twenty-first Amendment. Even more telling for our purposes, in
his discussion of the Court’s treatment of the Import-Export Clause,
Justice Black expressly noted the Court’s abandonment of the
statutory canon of construction:
[T]he clause against taxing imports is general . . . . Section 2 of
the Twenty-first Amendment, by contrast, is not general in its
application. . . . It seems a trifle off to hold that an Amendment
adopted in 1933 in specific terms to meet a specific twentiethcentury problem must yield to a provision written in 1787 to meet
61
a more general, although no less important, problem.

The Court’s treatment of constitutional conflicts between the ImportExport Clause and the Twenty-first Amendment has disturbed some
62
commentators, but it is consistent with the Court’s treatment of
state liquor regulation cases under the Commerce Clause:
notwithstanding the specificity and the timing of Section 2 of the
Twenty-first Amendment, it must be considered in light of other
earlier and more general constitutional provisions. And most of the
time, Section 2 loses.
In addition to the Commerce Clause and the Import-Export
Clause, the Court has also considered challenges to state liquor laws
on First Amendment and Equal Protection grounds. Each time,
Section 2 has failed to save the state regulation of liquor. In 44
63
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, the Court struck a Rhode Island ban
on the advertising of liquor prices by manufacturers, wholesalers, or
59

Id. at 344.
Id. at 346 (Black, J., dissenting).
61
Id. at 347–48 (emphasis added).
62
Denning, supra note 43, at 323 (“Arguably, the [Twenty-first] Amendment
necessarily qualified the [Import-Export] Clause . . . .”); David S. Versfelt, Note, The
Effect of the Twenty-first Amendment on State Authority to Control Intoxicating Liquors,
75 COLUM. L. REV. 1578, 1584–85 (1975) (“It would not . . . have been so
‘extraordinary’ to conclude that the Twenty-first amendment had ‘repealed’ the
export-import clause with respect to intoxicants.”).
63
517 U.S. 484 (1996).
60
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shippers from without the state, or by licensed persons within, as
64
violative of the First Amendment. Considering the argument that
the Twenty-first Amendment should tilt the Court’s analysis in the
state’s favor, the Court held that “the Twenty-first Amendment does
not qualify the constitutional prohibition against laws abridging the
65
freedom of speech embodied in the First Amendment.” By holding
that the Twenty-first Amendment does not qualify the First
Amendment, the Court arguably followed the more general of the
two provisions: the sort of commercial speech at issue in 44
Liquormart (price advertisements) is not “core” speech typically
66
entitled to maximum protection under the First Amendment.
Section 2, by contrast, would seem specifically to delegate to the
states broad discretion to regulate the liquor industry as each state
67
sees fit. Again, the Court appeared to favor the interests embodied
in an earlier and more general constitutional provision, rather than
the state’s interests in liquor regulation embodied in the later and
more specific amendment.
68
In Craig v. Boren, the Court considered an equal protection
challenge to an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale of “non69
alcoholic” beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under
70
the age of 18. Purporting to justify the disparate treatment of males
as designed to enhance traffic safety, the state provided statistical
evidence establishing that, among other things, of people between
the ages of 18 and 21, more men than women were arrested for
driving while intoxicated. Although conceding that this had some

64

Id. at 516.
Id.
66
See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980); see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484,
517 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I will take my guidance as to what the
Constitution forbids, with regard to a text as indeterminate as the First Amendment’s
preservation of the ‘freedom of speech,’ and where the core offense of suppressing
particular political ideas is not at issue, from the long-accepted practices of the
American people.”) (emphasis added).
67
See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,
106–07 (1980) (stating that the Twenty-first Amendment “grants the states virtually
complete control over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how to
structure the liquor distribution system”); 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335,
346 (1987); see also North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 431 (1990).
68
429 U.S. 190 (1976).
69
The “non-alcoholic” beer at issue was actually 3.2% alcohol by volume and was
therefore within the scope of the Twenty-first Amendment. Id. at 192.
70
Id.
65
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71

statistical significance, the Court nevertheless found the evidence
insufficient to justify a gender-based classification. In a complete
72
reversal of its prior cases, the Court held that the Twenty-first
Amendment has no effect whatsoever on equal protection
73
requirements.
It is worth noting that in the Equal Protection
context (as in the First Amendment context), as opposed to the
Commerce Clause context, the Court did not weigh constitutional
interests when considering a conflict with Section 2. Rather, the
Court held that state liquor laws, regardless of their specific
authorization in the text of Section 2—even liquor laws reflecting a
rational legislative judgment borne out by supporting statistical
74
evidence —cannot withstand scrutiny under the earlier-enacted and
more general Equal Protection provision if the liquor laws classify on
75
the basis of gender.
71

The Court conceded that the disparity in arrests (.18% of females versus 2% of
males) “is not trivial in a statistical sense.” Id. at 201.
72
E.g., Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401, 403 (1938) (“[S]ince the
adoption of the Twenty-First Amendment, the equal protection clause is not
applicable to imported intoxicating liquor.”); State Bd. of Equalization v. Young’s
Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 64 (1936) (“A classification recognized by the Twenty-First
Amendment cannot be deemed forbidden by the Fourteenth.”); see also Indianapolis
Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm’n, 305 U.S. 391, 394 (1939) (“[D]iscrimination
between domestic and imported intoxicating liquors, . . . is not prohibited by the
equal protection clause.”).
73
Craig, 429 U.S. at 208–09 (“We thus hold that the operation of the Twenty-first
Amendment does not alter the application of equal protection standards that
otherwise govern this case.”).
74
The Court for the first time in Craig subjected gender-based classifications to
intermediate judicial scrutiny.
Id. at 197-98.
The Court, however, almost
unanimously agreed that the statute would have survived under the less exacting
rational basis test. See id. at 217 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (indicating that eight
members of the Court did not find the statute irrational). The lower court,
comprised of a three-judge panel, upheld the law under the rational basis test.
Walker v. Hall, 399 F. Supp. 1304 (D. Okla. 1975); see also R. Darcy & Jenny
Sanbrano, Oklahoma in the Development of Equal Rights: The ERA, 3.2% Beer, Juvenile
Justice, and Craig v. Boren, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1009, 1045 (1997).
75
Note that the Court does not resolve the issue in 44 Liquormart or Craig by
holding that the state regulations at issue fall outside the scope of Section 2 because
the regulations are not related to the “transportation” or “importation” of liquor.
Instead, even assuming the applicability of Section 2, the latest and most specific
provision that speaks to the state law at issue, the Court held that Section 2 may
never trump the earlier and more general dictates of the First Amendment or Equal
Protection Clause that would otherwise apply.
Craig, unlike 44 Liquormart, claims a historical basis for reading the earlier and
more general Equal Protection provision as controlling. Craig, 429 U.S. at 206
(“Neither the text nor the history of the Twenty-first Amendment suggests that it
qualifies individual rights protected by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment where the sale of liquor is concerned.”). To the extent the Craig Court
was actually driven by a historical exegesis of Section 2, the Craig decision could be
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Since the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment, the Court
has considered the relationship between Section 2 and various more
general and earlier-enacted constitutional provisions. Whether
76
considering the dormant Commerce Clause, the Commerce
77
78
79
Clause, the Import-Export Clause, the First Amendment, or the
80
Equal Protection clause, since the mid-1960s, the Court has
consistently favored the earlier and more general provision.
Meanwhile, the Court has given little weight—practically none—to
the states’ Section 2 authority to regulate liquor, notwithstanding the
specificity of Section 2’s text and the later date of its enactment.
Regardless of the breadth of state authority to regulate liquor under
the text of the Twenty-first Amendment, the cases make clear that the
text of that amendment does not “license the States to ignore their
81
Indeed,
obligations under other provisions of the Constitution.”
the Court has so restricted the effect of Section 2 as to render it
nearly null.
The Court’s Twenty-first Amendment cases can be read as
abandoning the statutory canon of construction that would have
otherwise found Section 2, as the later and more specific provision,
controlling in the liquor context. This rejection of the statutory
canon illustrates the interpretive choices available to a judge
considering a conflict between a marriage amendment and an earlier
and more general equal protection or privacy provision. By weighing
interests embodied in particular constitutional provisions,
irrespective of the provisions’ timing and specificity, the Supreme
Court provides a conceptual framework within which a court might
find a same-sex marriage ban constitutionally infirm, notwithstanding

read in ways other than the one I suggest (i.e., the Court did not simply abandon the
canon of construction; rather, as a matter of historical interpretation, the later
amendment was not intended to qualify the earlier provision, the two provisions are
not really in conflict, and thus the canon of construction is simply unnecessary). But
if the Court was driven by the absence of any historical evidence that Section 2 was
meant to qualify the Equal Protection Clause, that would be precisely the time to
employ the statutory canon of construction. In other words, if there were no
statement in the history of Section 2 one way or the other with respect to its effect on
the Equal Protection Clause, as Craig seems to suggest, the canon serves as a proxy
for that unexpressed intent: the latest and most specific provision is assumed to be
the provision the enacting body intended to control.
76
See supra notes 19–54 and accompanying text.
77
See supra note 38.
78
See supra notes 55–62 and accompanying text.
79
See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text.
80
See supra notes 68–75 and accompanying text.
81
Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984).
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that a constitution may contain a very late and very specific marriage
amendment.
II
The Supreme Court’s Twenty-first Amendment cases, as I have
interpreted them, may be read as abandoning the traditional canon
of construction that later and more specific provisions govern over
earlier and more general provisions. But the canon, depending as it
does on the timing of constitutional provisions, merits special
attention in the constitutional context. As I will argue below, there
may be particular reasons—reasons grounded in what might be
termed the atemporal nature of at least some constitutional
provisions—for suspecting the later-governs-over-earlier canon a
particularly ill fit in the constitutional context. First, drawing on the
Supreme Court’s retroactivity cases, I argue that, because some
constitutional principles would seem to declare rather than create
law, it makes little sense to conceive of those provisions as coming
into existence on the date of ratification; declared law is better
thought of as existing before, at, and after ratification. Second,
because equal protection provisions and privacy provisions are
dynamic, drawing their meaning from an evolving sense of equality
and autonomy, those provisions are especially difficult to locate in
time; as evolving standards develop, those provisions might well be
thought of as “later” than even later-ratified provisions.
The Supreme Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence provides an
interesting lens through which to consider the temporal dimensions
of constitutional law. Specifically, the retroactivity cases illustrate the
theoretical difficulty with considering marriage amendments as
“later” or equal protection or privacy provisions as “earlier” for
purposes of applying the canon of construction that later provisions
govern over earlier. The Court’s retroactivity cases have wrestled with
the extent to which a new judicial rule should apply to conduct that
occurred prior to the new rule’s announcement. The retroactivity
cases decided by the Warren Court and continuing into the 1980s
allowed for the prospective application of judicial rules under certain
82
circumstances. For example, the Court in Linkletter v. Walker held
83
that the Mapp v. Ohio decision extending the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule to the states would not apply to state criminal

82
83

381 U.S. 618 (1965).
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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convictions that had become final prior to the Mapp decision. The
85
Court in Johnson v. New Jersey later extended the Linkletter
retroactivity test to the question of whether new rules of criminal
procedure ought to apply to defendants whose cases were pending on
86
direct review. As a result of Linkletter and Johnson, quite a few new
rules of criminal procedure were held not to apply to defendants
whose convictions had become final or whose cases were pending on
direct review when the new rule was articulated. On the civil side, the
Court similarly allowed for the selective prospective application of
87
new judicial rules.
88
Beginning in the 1980’s, with Griffith v. Kentucky, however, the
Court began what would ultimately become an abandonment of its
selective prospective application of new precedent in both the
89
In Griffith, the Court held that its
criminal and civil contexts.
90
holding in Batson v. Kentucky should be applied to all cases on direct
review, even those cases in which the race-based jury selection
occurred before the Court formally held that such discrimination
violated the Constitution. As the Court explained in Griffith, the

84

In denying criminal defendants the benefit of the new Mapp rule on habeas
review, the Court articulated a test for determining whether to allow a new rule of
criminal procedure to apply retroactively to cases that had become final before the
new rule was announced: weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking at
the purpose of the new rule, the reliance placed on the previous doctrine, and the
effect on the administration of justice of a retrospective application of the new rule.
Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636.
85
384 U.S. 719 (1966).
86
Id. at 728.
87
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971). The Chevron Oil Court
articulated a test for whether a judicial rule should apply prospectively in the civil
context. Id. at 106-07. Under the Chevron Oil test, a court was to consider whether
the decision articulates a new principle of law, whether retroactive application would
further or retard the operation of the new rule, and whether retroactive application
of the new rule would produce substantial inequitable results. Id.
88
479 U.S. 314 (1987).
89
The Court first disfavored prospective application in the criminal procedure
context, with its decision in Griffith, holding that new rules of criminal procedure
should be applied to all cases pending on direct review at the time the new rule was
announced. Id. at 328. The Court’s criminal retroactivity jurisprudence was
subsequently applied in the civil context in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501
U.S. 529 (1991). With its decision in Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, the
Court fully incorporated its criminal procedure retroactivity jurisprudence into its
civil retroactivity doctrine: “When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the
parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be
given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all events,
regardless of whether such events predate or postdate our announcement of the
rule.” 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993).
90
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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prospective application of judicial precedents is incompatible with
91
The Court
the “basic norms of constitutional adjudication.”
observed that “[u]nlike a legislature, we do not promulgate new rules
92
of constitutional criminal procedure on a broad basis.”
And,
quoting Justice Harlan, the Court commented that:
[i]f we do not resolve all cases before us on direct review in light
of our best understanding of governing constitutional principles,
it is difficult to see why we should so adjudicate any case at all. . . .
In truth, the Court’s assertion of power to disregard current law
in adjudicating cases before us that have not already run the full
course of appellate review, is quite simply an assertion that our
constitutional function is not one of adjudication but in effect of
93
legislation.

Under Griffith, the reasoning of which was later applied in the
civil context as well, a court should decide all cases on direct review in
light of the court’s best understanding of the law, regardless of
whether that understanding was announced before or after the
conduct at issue in the case. This requirement that judicial rules be
applied to conduct occurring both before and after the
announcement of those rules is consistent with the view that judges
94
The prospective application of
declare, rather than create, law.
91

Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322.
Id.
93
Id. at 323 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mackey v. United
States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment)).
94
James B. Beam Distilling, 501 U.S. at 535–36 (noting that the Griffith approach
“reflects the declaratory theory of law, according to which courts are understood only
to find the law, not to make it”) (citations omitted).
The view that judges in some sense declare, rather than create, law is, in fact,
fundamental to a court’s day-to-day adjudicative function (quite apart from the
question of whether new rules should be applied retroactively to other cases on
direct review). Consider the following example: Adjudicating a controversy between
A and B, a court announces new rule X. Even though the new rule X is announced
after the relevant conduct between A and B has already occurred, by deciding the
case and allocating relief as between A and B, the court treats X as though it were the
law at the time of the relevant conduct between A and B. In other words, the court is
treated as declaring X—the declaration of which poses no theoretical problem when
the rule is applied to A and B. If, on the other hand, the court were construed as
creating X, the application of X to A and B would be potentially unfair to whichever
party had relied on X’s absence; after all, on a judge-creation theory, X was not the
law when the relevant conduct occurred. See Bradley Scott Shannon, The Retroactive
and Prospective Application of Judicial Decisions, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 811 (2003)
(noting that courts typically decide cases based on what is perceived at the time of
adjudication, not the state of the law before adjudication, and indicating that
“[t]here is, of course, nothing unusual about such ‘retroactive’ applications of
current law; in fact, they occur in the vast majority of cases without discussion or even
thought”).
92
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judicial decisions, on the other hand, a practice now thoroughly
disfavored by the Court, is consistent with a view of judicial rules as
judge-created, rather than judge-declared.
Justice Scalia has been the most transparent of the justices in
describing the neo-Blackstonian underpinnings of the Court’s
retroactivity jurisprudence. Considering the retroactivity of one of
the Court’s Commerce Clause decisions, Justice Scalia commented at
length:
I share Justice Stevens’ perception that prospective
decisionmaking is incompatible with the judicial role, which is to
say what the law is, not to prescribe what it shall be. The very
framing of the issue that we purport to describe today—whether
our [Commerce Clause decision] shall “apply” retroactively—
presupposes a view of our decisions as creating the law, as opposed
to declaring what the law already is. . . . To hold a governmental
Act to be unconstitutional is not to announce that we forbid it, but
that the Constitution forbids it . . . . Since the Constitution does
not change from year to year; since it does not conform to our
decisions, but our decisions are supposed to conform to it; the
notion that our interpretation of the Constitution in a particular
95
decision could take prospective form does not make sense.

As Justice Scalia observed, even to ask whether the new rule “applies
retroactively” is to misunderstand the new rule as being situated in
time; asking whether a judicial rule “applies retroactively” is to
suggest erroneously that the rule began when it was announced.
Judicial law, as declared law, properly conceived, is atemporal. Only
statutory law or other created law, can properly be understood to
“apply retroactively,” i.e. to be applied to situations that occurred
before the statutory rule was created.
Having described the distinction between declared and created
law and the idea that judicial rules, as declared law, should not be
prospectively applied, we now return to our hypothetical case of a
marriage amendment conflicting with an earlier-ratified equal
protection or privacy provision. At first blush, it might appear that
constitutional provisions are more like statutory provisions than
judicial opinions and thus, like statutory provisions, ought to apply
95

Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, in considering
the retroactive effect of the Court’s ruling in Bacchus Imports, see supra notes 34–49
and accompanying text, commented that the prospective application of judicial rules
is inconsistent with the judicial power—“the power ‘to say what the law is,’ not the
power to change it.” James B. Beam Distilling, 501 U.S. at 549 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
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96

only prospectively. After all, unlike judicial decisions, which declare
what the law is, constitutional provisions, like statutory provisions,
would seem to create law, and thus present no conceptual difficulty
if prospectively applied or treated as coming into existence
with ratification.
The canon of construction preferring later
constitutional provisions over earlier provisions could be applied, and
the marriage amendment, as the later provision, would appear to
govern over the marriage question.
But if some constitutional provisions were determined not to
create law, but instead to declare moral or natural law principles, the
process of promulgating at least some “new” constitutional law may
have much more in common with judicial decisionmaking than with
legislation. Because such constitutional provisions would merely
declare, rather than create, those moral principles, it would make as
little sense to argue that these provisions were “enacted” on their
ratification dates as it would to suggest that judicial rules should apply
only after their announcement. In both cases, the declared rule,
whether a constitutional provision or a judicial decision, is properly
understood atemporally, as applying both before and after its
ratification or announcing case. Consequently, certain provisions of
a constitution may not sensibly be susceptible to construction
by appeal to the canon preferring later-, over earlier-, enacted
provisions.
At the federal level, any search in the Constitution for evidence
of natural law principles typically begins with the text of the Ninth
Amendment: “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage other rights
97
retained by the people.” Many commentators have seen in these
“other” rights retained by the people express textual support in the
Constitution for unexpressed, but fully enforceable moral or natural
98
rights. By recognizing and securing rights not enumerated in the
96

See Mark Strasser, Baehr Mysteries, Retroactivity, and the Concept of Law, 41 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 161, 173–74 (2000) (discussing the strong presumption against the
retroactive application of constitutional amendments to validate a previously void
law); see also Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 311–12 (1994) (“The
principle that statutes operate only prospectively, while judicial decisions operate
retrospectively, is familiar to every law student . . . .” (quoting United States v. Sec.
Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79 (1982))).
97
U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
98
See, e.g., STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND
COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 173 (1990) (“The Constitution itself does
not claim to create or confer rights, it only ‘secures’ them. And the Ninth
Amendment explicitly calls upon constitutional interpreters not to ‘deny or
disparage’ the existence of rights not stated explicitly in the Constitution’s text.”); see
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Constitution, the Ninth Amendment seems to imply that at least
some constitutional rights are not created by the Constitution, but
instead are retained irrespective of whether they have been
99
On this reading of the Ninth Amendment, had the
articulated.
framers failed to include provisions securing, for example, freedom
of religion or freedom of speech, those human rights would
nevertheless have been enforceable constraints against the exercise of
100
It follows, then, that it makes little sense to
governmental power.
conceive of these provisions as coming into effect in 1791, when the
Bill of Rights was ratified; they would exist and would be fully
enforceable regardless of ratification at all, much less ratification on
any particular date.
Whether one accepts this view of the Ninth Amendment as
providing a textual basis for enforcing unenumerated constitutional
101
rights or not, it remains relatively noncontroversial that the framers
also Thomas B. McAffee, The Bill of Rights, Social Contract Theory, and the Rights
“Retained” by the People, in 2 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND
MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 327, 327 n.2 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1993); David
N. Mayer, The Natural Rights Basis of the Ninth Amendment: A Reply to Professor McAffee,
in 2 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra, at 367, 371–73. Indeed, James
Madison felt that the Ninth Amendment was necessary because an enumeration of
certain rights in the Bill of Rights might be construed as signaling that any rights not
enumerated are not constitutionally protected. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (Joseph
Gales ed., 1790).
99
Similarly, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
appears to protect certain unenumerated individual rights from governmental
encroachment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
100
While the Ninth Amendment has recently received significant scholarly
attention, it has not played prominently as a textual authority for the Supreme
Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence. Probably the most famous invocation
of the Ninth Amendment as a textual hook for the enforcement of unenumerated
constitutional rights is Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), in which the
Court held that unenumerated privacy rights created by various constitutional
provisions, including the Ninth Amendment, precluded Connecticut from outlawing
birth control for married couples. The Court further noted that the right of privacy,
far from being created by the Constitution, is “older than the Bill of Rights.” Id. at
486. Justice Goldberg, in his famous concurring opinion, made plain the centrality
of the Ninth Amendment to the Court’s holding. Id. at 486–87 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (“My conclusion that the concept of liberty is not so restricted [to the
express terms of the Bill of Rights] and that it embraces the right of marital privacy
though that right is not mentioned explicitly in the Constitution is supported both
by numerous decisions of this Court . . . and by the language and history of the Ninth
Amendment.”).
101
Others have argued that, although the Ninth Amendment provides that the
enumeration of some rights does not imply the derogation of others, it does not
provide an independent basis for the invalidation of legislation enacted pursuant to a
delegated power. See, e.g., McAffee, supra note 98, at 327. But see Steven Heyman,
Natural Rights and Positive Law, in 2 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note
98, at 381, 381; Mayer, supra note 98, at 367.
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both spoke and thought in terms of natural rights and viewed the Bill
of Rights as, to some degree, recognizing or declaring, rather than
102
That the framers believed in the a priori
creating, those rights.
existence of certain rights can scarcely be doubted upon a reading of
the first sentence of the Declaration of Independence, which
provides that all human beings are endowed by a Creator with
“certain inalienable rights.”
Because certain of the framers
apparently intended that some constitutional provisions declare
principles of natural or moral law, rather than create that law, it
makes little sense to suppose that those principles began to exist only
after their ratification. For the same reasons animating the Supreme
Court’s modern retroactivity jurisprudence, prospective application
of constitutional provisions declaring (as opposed to creating) law
does not make sense. Every constitutional provision that declares a
moral or natural law principle, properly conceived, existed before,
103
Relying on a “later”
during, and after the provision’s ratification.
Still others have argued that the Ninth Amendment is a “rights” analog to the
“powers” provision of the Tenth Amendment—that just as the powers not delegated
to the federal government remain with the states, the articulation of certain federal
rights should not be construed as denying or disparaging rights retained by the
people under state law. Russell L. Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth
Amendment, in 1 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF
THE NINTH AMENDMENT 243, 243 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989). President Ronald
Reagan’s failed appointee to the United States Supreme Court, Robert Bork,
famously referred to the Ninth Amendment as an indecipherable “inkblot” in the
Constitution. Bork later settled on the view, discussed above, that the provision
protects rights retained by individuals under state law. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds,
Sex, Lies, and Jurisprudence: Robert Bork, Griswold and the Philosophy of Original
Understanding, 24 GA. L. REV. 1045, 1083 n.134 (1990), for a discussion of the
implausibility of Bork’s understanding of the Ninth Amendment.
102
E.g., Eugene M. Van Loan III, Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment, in 1 THE
RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note 101, at 149, 162–63 (“[T]he existence of
natural law and natural rights and the latter’s immunity from governmental
regulation were accepted by almost all. Natural rights, therefore, were those which
required no constitutional protection, and the addition of amendments covering
them would only be ‘declaratory’ of their inviolability.”). The irrelevance of the
articulation of natural rights principles was argued forcefully by Alexander Hamilton:
“The Sacred Rights of Mankind are not to be rummaged for among old parchments
or musty records. They are written, as with a sunbeam, in the whole volume of
human nature, by the hand of Divinity itself, and can never be erased or obscured by
mortal power.” 1 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 113 (H. Lodge ed., 1904).
While my discussion has focused on natural law in the U.S. Constitution, state
constitutions, especially early constitutions, contain a great deal of language
suggesting that the framers of those constitutions believed they were declaring, and
not creating, certain natural law principles. See Robert F. Williams, Equality
Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1195 (1985).
103
Walter Murphy has suggested one instance in which the Supreme Court may
have treated constitutional provisions in exactly the atemporal manner that a law-asdeclared reading would require. In Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), in
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provision as controlling in a particular case would only make sense
when the Court is construing a rule in fact created by the Constitution.
While some constitutional provisions declare moral or natural
104
rights, others obviously do not.
In determining whether to apply
the canon of construction preferring later over earlier constitutional
provisions, how, then, should one determine which constitutional
provisions implicate moral or natural rights and which do not?
Fortunately, the constitutional provisions at issue for purposes of this
Article—equal protection provisions, privacy provisions, and
marriage amendments—are relatively clear cases of the articulation
105
of moral or natural law principles. Equality of treatment under the
law, the right to be left alone in familial and sexual matters, and
traditional norms of sexuality, to the respective advocates of each,

considering the constitutionality of segregated schools in the District of Columbia,
the Court may well have incorporated some portion of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause (a later provision) into the Fifth Amendment (an earlier
provision). See Walter F. Murphy, Merlin’s Memory: The Past and Future Imperfect of the
Once and Future Polity, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 163, 172 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (stating that, in
Bolling, the “Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment, ratified in 1791,
incorporated at least some of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, ratified in 1868. There are, of course, other possible interpretations of
Bolling, but none quite so intriguing . . . .” (citations omitted)).
104
Compare, for example, the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment with the Article II requirement that the president be at least
thirty-five years old. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
105
State and federal privacy and equal protection provisions have as their
archetype the Declaration of Independence and its catalog of the “inalienable rights”
that are “endowed by the Creator.” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S.
1776). Principles of equality and privacy, whether codified in constitutions or not,
are the life-blood of liberal democracy. Inequality, for example, in the form of
slavery or denial of the franchise, did not become constitutionally suspect only with
the passage of the Thirteenth and Nineteenth Amendments. This inequality was
always deeply at odds with the very cornerstone of democracy: that all persons are
created equal. The same can be said of principles of privacy; they are grounded not
in text but instead are fundamental to the concept of liberty itself.
On the other side, marriage amendments can scarcely be viewed as anything
other than collective statements of moral conviction—generally a religious
conviction—that same-sex sex is, and has always been, deeply immoral. Writing a
separate concurrence in Bowers v. Hardwick, then-Chief Justice Burger described
same-sex sex as “the infamous crime against nature,” an offense of “deeper malignity
than rape, a heinous act the very mention of which is a disgrace to human nature.”
478 U.S. 186, 196–97 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *215). Justice Blackmun,
demonstrating the natural law nature of the privacy right at stake, commented in his
Bowers dissent that “this case is about the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men, namely, the right to be let alone.” Id. at 199
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
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represent bedrock moral or natural law principles. On all sides of the
marriage debate, opponents would tend to agree that these principles
apply whether we recognize them or not, whether we live up to their
ideals or not, and whether they are codified in our constitutions or
not. As declared principles, these principles are most properly
thought of as atemporal; and situated out of time, it makes little
sense, for purposes of constitutional interpretation, to view the
marriage amendment as “later” or the equal protection or privacy
provisions as “earlier.”
Consequently, with respect to these
constitutional provisions, the canon of construction that prefers later
and more specific provisions over earlier and more general provisions
may be an inapt interpretive tool.
There is a second fundamental problem with employing the
later-over-earlier canon in the marriage context. To the extent a
constitution’s equal protection and privacy provisions are dynamic,
drawing their content from evolving notions of equality and
autonomy, they may well outgrow other contemporaneous or later
provisions of that constitution. In other words, as society evolves,
those dynamic provisions also evolve and thus may properly be
considered “later” than contemporary and later-ratified constitutional
provisions that reflect outdated notions of equality and autonomy.
Consider, for example, the Supreme Court’s Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. In 1972, the Supreme Court, in Furman
106
v. Georgia, struck capital punishment as it was then implemented as
violative of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and
unusual” punishment. The opinion was badly fractured, and the
precise nature of the Court’s holding is difficult to discern, but a
majority of the Court plainly embraced the view that the Eighth
Amendment is not static, but instead “acquire[s] meaning as public
107
In other
opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.”
words, a majority of the Court considered the Eighth Amendment
sufficiently dynamic to potentially (though not as of yet) render capital
108
And by recognizing this
punishment unconstitutional per se.
106

408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Id. at 241 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910))
(Douglas, J., concurring). In other words, the content of the Eighth Amendment
draws its meaning from “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.” Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
108
Justices Brennan and Marshall would have rendered capital punishment
unconstitutional per se. Id. at 304 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 358–59 (Marshall,
J., concurring).
Although stopping short of declaring capital punishment
unconstitutional per se, Justice White nevertheless indicated that, in his view, the
moment capital punishment no longer furthers the social ends it has been deemed
107
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interpretive possibility, the Court allowed that the Eighth
Amendment, over time, might outgrow contemporaneous Fifth
109
that by their terms appear to place a
Amendment provisions
110
constitutional imprimatur on capital punishment.
By drafting the
Fifth Amendment procedural protections contemporaneously with
the Eighth Amendment at Time One (T1), we may assume that the
framers viewed at least some instances of capital punishment
(presumably those with adequate procedural safeguards) as nonviolative of the Eighth Amendment. But, if at Time Two (T2),
evolving standards of decency have evolved sufficiently, Furman

to serve, it would be prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 312 (White, J.,
concurring). In two dissenting opinions, one written by Chief Justice Burger and the
other by Justice Powell, each representing the views of the Chief Justice and Justices
Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, capital punishment could in theory be
unconstitutional per se under the Eighth Amendment. Furman, 408 U.S. at 382–84
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 433–34 (Powell, J., dissenting). According to Chief
Justice Burger, state legislatures would likely invalidate death penalty statutes long
before the Eighth Amendment would counsel striking capital punishment. Id. at
382–84 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). According to Justice Powell, although it would in
theory be possible to hold the death penalty unconstitutional per se, such a holding
would be exceedingly unlikely. Id. at 433–34 (Powell, J., dissenting). Writing
separately, Justice Blackmun indicated that the Eighth Amendment may acquire
meaning as public opinion evolves, but he felt that the Furman majority was slightly
ahead of the public in its treatment of capital punishment. Id. at 409–10 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
109
The Fifth Amendment contains three clauses, or more accurately, parts of
clauses, that would be without effect were the Eighth Amendment to be construed as
rendering capital punishment unconstitutional per se:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital . . . crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury; . . .
[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb; . . .
[N]or be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.
U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphases added).
110
That the Court was aware that it was endorsing an interpretive choice that
might potentially render portions of the Fifth Amendment null is demonstrated by
Chief Justice Burger’s and Justice Powell’s dissenting opinions, both of which
pointed out the Fifth Amendment language providing procedural protections in
capital cases. Furman, 408 U.S. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 414 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). Justice Powell comes the closest to holding that the Fifth Amendment
provisions preclude a holding that capital punishment is unconstitutional per se:
“[T]he Court is not free to read into the Constitution a meaning that is plainly at
variance with its language.” Id. at 420 (Powell, J., dissenting). But even Justice
Powell concedes that the Fifth Amendment text is not dispositive. As noted above,
supra note 108, Justice Powell allowed that capital punishment could conceivably be
unconstitutional per se, albeit by only the most “conclusive of objective
demonstrations,” a nearly “insuperable” obstacle. Id. at 433–34.
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suggests that the Fifth Amendment provisions ratified at T1 may be
rendered null.
The Furman logic would apply not only to a provision ratified
contemporaneously with the Eighth Amendment, but also to one
ratified after the Eighth Amendment. Assume that a hypothetical
amendment to the U.S. Constitution was ratified in 1921, providing
that: “Any person duly convicted of treason against the United States
shall be put to death.” The hypothetical amendment undoubtedly
reflects an understanding in 1921 that capital punishment was not
cruel and unusual. If, however, evolving standards of decency in
2006 universally condemn the practice as cruel and unusual, the
Court may, under Furman, hold that capital punishment is per se
unconstitutional notwithstanding the 1921 amendment. In other
words, the Eighth Amendment, though earlier ratified, for purposes
of constitutional interpretation, may well be considered “later” than
111
our hypothetical 1921 amendment.
By analogy, if equal protection or privacy provisions are
understood as dynamic, reflecting society’s evolving standards of
112
equality and autonomy,
those provisions might be capable of
111

Of course, if there were evidence that the 1921 amendment were intended
normatively to condition the Eighth Amendment, the Furman interpretive approach
would be more problematic. It should be noted, however, that absent evidence to
the contrary, the text of the 1921 amendment does not, on its own, compel us to
understand it as normatively conditioning the scope of the Eighth Amendment. We
might just as well read the 1921 amendment as describing the scope of thenprevailing notions of cruelty (i.e., that the drafters of the 1921 amendment perceived
no tension with the Eighth Amendment) without going the further step of
concluding that the amendment was meant to preclude any future finding that
capital punishment violates Eighth Amendment constitutional norms.
The legislative history of the Hawaii marriage amendment illustrates the
difficulty of discerning legislative intent on this score (not to mention the problem
with discerning the intent of the “people”). The legislative history also counsels
against assuming that a later-ratified specific marriage amendment ipso facto
conditions an earlier equal protection provision. The final version of the Hawaii
marriage amendment was the culmination of a long and tortuous compromise
between the Hawaii House of Representatives, which wanted expressly to overrule
Baehr’s holding that the same-sex marriage prohibition constituted gender
discrimination under the equal protection provision, see supra note 7, and the Senate,
which wanted expressly to preserve that holding. For an extended discussion of the
legislative history, see David Orgon Coolidge, The Hawai’i Marriage Amendment: Its
Origins, Meaning and Fate, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 19, 42–82 (2000).
112
The Supreme Court has at various times endorsed both the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses as dynamic. E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571–73
(2003) (indicating that the laws and emerging traditions of the last half-century are
most instructive for purposes of interpreting the Due Process Clause and remarking
that “[h]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending
point of the substantive due process inquiry”) (citation omitted); Harper v. Va. State
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669–70 (1966):
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nullifying later-ratified provisions of the constitution that reflect
earlier (mis)understandings of what the equal protection or privacy
provisions require. Just as in Furman, the fact that a later-ratified
marriage amendment reflects certain assumptions about equality and
autonomy at T2 ought not necessarily preclude prevailing notions of
equality and autonomy at T3 from rendering the marriage
amendment inoperative, notwithstanding that the equal protection
or privacy provision was ratified at T1. In other words, when
considering a dynamic provision, it makes far more sense to consider
it as coming into effect at T3, for purposes of applying the latergoverning-over-earlier canon, rather than on its date of ratification at
113
In the case of dynamic provisions that draw meaning from
T1.
changing social circumstances, then, ratification dates might be
particularly irrelevant for purposes of deciding which of two
conflicting provisions should govern. The conceptual difficulty with
locating dynamic constitutional provisions in time seriously
undermines the utility of the statutory canon.
In addition to the Supreme Court’s Twenty-first Amendment
cases, which suggest interpretive space for rejecting the canon of
construction that later and more specific provisions govern over
earlier and more general provisions, we have examined two
conceptual problems with applying the canon in the constitutional
context. Determining which constitutional provision is “later” than
another is particularly difficult, both for provisions that appear
to declare moral and natural law principles and for provisions that
are dynamic, drawing their meaning from changing social
circumstances.

[T]he Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of
a particular era. In determining what lines are unconstitutionally
discriminatory, we have never been confined to historic notions of
equality, any more than we have restricted due process to a fixed
catalogue of what was at a given time deemed to be the limits of
fundamental rights. Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes
of the Equal Protection Clause do change.
(emphasis added) (citation omitted).
113
It makes as little sense to suggest that by passing a marriage amendment, the
“people” must have intended to condition the Equal Protection Clause, as it does to
suggest that by writing procedural protections into the Fifth Amendment, or by
passing a subsequent hypothetical amendment, the framers must have intended to
carve capital punishment from the ambit of the Eighth Amendment. See supra notes
106–11 and accompanying text.
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III
I have argued that the Supreme Court’s Twenty-first
Amendment jurisprudence can be read as a model for rejecting the
traditional modes of statutory interpretation in the constitutional
context. The Court provides for an interpretive approach permitting
a later and more specific amendment to be considered in light of
constitutional principles articulated in earlier and more general
provisions. Indeed, the Court’s Twenty-first Amendment cases
illustrate that one provision does not necessarily trump another
merely because it is later or more specific. I have also suggested that
there may be particular problems in the constitutional context with
the statutory canon requiring that later provisions govern over earlier
ones.
There may be a basis, then, both grounded in precedent and
theoretically sound, for rejecting, at least in the constitutional
context, the canon of construction that later and more specific
provisions govern over earlier and more general provisions. If so,
there may be no basis (or at least less basis) for concluding that
marriage amendments automatically trump any claim to a same-sex
marriage right grounded in a constitution’s privacy or equal
protection provisions. To be clear, under the interpretive approach I
have suggested, judges considering such marriage-right claims have
an interpretive choice to make: either follow the marriage
amendment or follow the equality or privacy provision. There may
be persuasive reasons for choosing one provision over the other, but
there is a choice to be made—a choice that ought to be deliberate and
explained.
Regardless of the theoretical legitimacy of my suggested
interpretive alternative, there may be extremely persuasive reasons
for rejecting it. To the extent judicial articulation of a same-sex
marriage right as constitutionally required has met with widespread
backlash, any judicial invalidation of state (or federal) marriage
amendments (no matter how justified as an interpretive move) may
114
be perceived as bald judicial activism. And perhaps my interpretive
114

Principally, it might be argued that if judges adopted the interpretive approach
I suggest in this Article, they would be essentially amending state (and possibly
federal) constitutions outside the formal amendment processes established in those
documents. Of course, this criticism assumes that the amendment processes
articulated in state and federal constitutions are the exclusive ways those documents
may be revised. For an alternative to this exclusive view, see Akhil Reed Amar,
Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION,
supra note 103, at 89. As a descriptive matter, it is extremely problematic to
contextualize the most fundamental changes in our constitutional regime as
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suggestions should be rejected to the extent they would commonly be
perceived as undermining the democratic processes that gave rise to
those state (and perhaps federal) marriage amendments.
But what of the future? If and when future generations come to
a more nuanced understanding of the range of human sexualities,
and a more inclusive understanding of the fundamental legitimacy of
same-sex relationships, might not the continued enforcement of state
(and federal) constitutional marriage prohibitions be construed as
undermining the principles of equality enshrined in those same
constitutions? Might not the continued denial of meaningful access
by gays and lesbians to legislative reform on the issue of marriage
equality deeply offend the principle of democratic participation also
written into those constitutions?
Questions concerning constitutional legitimacy—the people’s
collective faith in its state and federal constitutions—are of central
importance any time amendments to those constitutions are
contemplated. The effect of a potential constitutional amendment
on our collective faith in the document, both now and in the future,
should play as major a role in the deliberation of a proposed
amendment as the particular policy objectives of the amendment
itself. Constitutional legitimacy is fragile; ill-conceived amendments
may chip away at our faith in our constitutions and ultimately
115
compromise our systems of government.
Unlike statutory compilations, constitutional legitimacy does not
depend on any extraconstitutional referent. To determine whether a
federal legislative statement, X, is good law, one need only determine
whether X has been passed by both houses of Congress and signed by
the President, as spelled out in Article I, Section 7 of the
116
Constitution (or, in the case of a state law, the analogous state
constitutional provision). Any proposition that complies with the
occurring strictly within the framework of Article V. See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin,
Constitutionalism in the United States: From Theory to Politics, in RESPONDING TO
IMPERFECTION, supra note 103, at 37; Bruce Ackerman, Higher Lawmaking, in
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 103, at 63. For a further reason to suppose
that Article V (and similar textual provisions for amendment in state constitutions) is
not the exclusive means of amendment, see infra notes 116–20 and accompanying
text.
115
Advocates of the Federal Marriage Amendment may be well advised to
consider the effect of the Eighteenth Amendment on the collective faith in the
American constitutional system. See KYVIG, supra note 42, at 97 (observing that a
great deal of the momentum for repeal was based on growing sentiment that the
Prohibition Amendment distorted the constitutional system by granting to the
federal government the sort of police power traditionally left to the states).
116
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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requirements of Article I, Section 7 is good (although not necessarily
provident) law. There is no extraconstitutional text or process to
which constitutions turn for legitimacy. As Frederick Schauer has
questioned, given two documents labeled “Constitution of the United
States,” one housed at the United States Archives, and the other
sketched out on the yellow legal pad on my desk, each claiming to be
the Constitution, how does one know which one is the Constitution?
Whatever the source of constitutional legitimacy of the version
contained in the national archives, it comes from something beyond
the text. For although we know very well that the constitution on my
legal pad is entirely fictive, it, like the version at the archives, claims
117
to be the authentic Constitution.
The important point here is that a constitution’s legitimacy is
not grounded in any other validating legal text or principle, and it is
likewise not grounded in the text of the constitution itself. The
legitimacy of state and federal constitutions is a political fact, what
Schauer, following H.L.A. Hart, calls the “ultimate rule of
118
recognition.” A constitution that is not recognized as legitimate by
the governed (as a matter of political fact) is not the Constitution. A
constitution that is recognized by the governed as legitimate is the
Constitution. And, as Schauer explains, once one recognizes that
constitutions may be wholly or partially displaced as the rule of
119
constitutions necessarily may be
recognition itself changes,
amended outside formal amendment mechanisms as social and
120
political contexts alter collective constitutional understandings.
117

Frederick Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions of a Constitution, in RESPONDING
supra note 103, at 145, 145.
118
Id. at 150. The rule of recognition—the way in which we know whether law is
valid or not—for statutes is found in constitutions (a statute is valid if it came into
being in accordance with procedural norms articulated in the constitution).
Constitutional validity, the ultimate rule of recognition, looks not to another legal
principle, but is instead a question of fact. Id. at 152.
119
A constitutional regime may be partially or wholly displaced, for example, by
revolution—the people’s choice of a new constitutional regime over an old without
complying with the terms of amendment contained in the earlier constitution.
120
Schauer provides an example:
[I]f the American people came to the realization that the Second
Amendment’s seeming protection of the right to keep and bear arms
was simply obsolete and unwise in light of the realities of 1994, and if
that view were shared by legislative, executive, and judicial officials, and
if all proceeded to treat the Second Amendment as a nullity despite the
fact that it had not been repealed according to the provisions of Article
V, then it would be accurate to say that the Constitution of the United
States did not contain the provision designated as “Amendment II” in
most versions of the document titled “the Constitution of the United
States.” The small c constitution would thus have been amended by
TO IMPERFECTION,
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If constitutions can be amended outside formal amendment
mechanisms as the ultimate rule of recognition changes, it follows
that if the ultimate rule of recognition today is sufficiently
incongruous with the ultimate rule of recognition when the
constitution was drafted, the official constitution (at least its official
text), would not necessarily be the Constitution. Consequently, if the
ultimate rule of recognition is at variance with the constitution’s text,
rigid adherence to that text would, in a literal sense, be
unconstitutional. More importantly, following the text in such a
circumstance would violate agreed-upon constitutional norms and
would run the risk of undermining our collective faith in the
document itself as the Constitution.
To the extent a marriage amendment that no longer conforms
to the ultimate rule of recognition is enforced, the legitimacy of
constitutional governance itself is potentially undermined. The
problem is all the more exacerbated when one considers the frailty of
the amendment process as a corrective measure: once lodged in the
constitution (especially at the federal level), a marriage amendment,
even one that has become disfavored since ratification, can be
121
Under these circumstances,
extraordinarily difficult to repeal.
following the Court’s Twenty-first Amendment model and
virtue of this amendment to the ultimate rule of recognition, even
though it could also be accurately said that the large C Constitution
had not been validly amended according to its own terms.
Schauer, supra note 117, at 156–57.
121
The Eighteenth Amendment is instructive on this point. Even as the law
became increasingly disfavored as violating states’ rights, discouraging temperance,
and undermining the constitutional system, many anti-prohibitionists thought that
the Amendment would be a permanent fixture of American life. No matter the
extent of the public outcry against the Amendment, it would remain in the
Constitution so long as prohibitionists had a certain amount of political clout in just
over a quarter of the states. See KYVIG, supra note 42, at 201 (“[T]he history of
prohibition repeal demonstrated the difficulty of overturning a constitutional
provision and the massive, sustained effort required. . . .”); see also David E. Kyvig,
Arranging for Amendment: Unintended Outcomes of Constitutional Design, in UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 9, 10 (David E. Kyvig ed., 2000). The
Depression, and the public perception that repeal would generate much-needed
revenues, may well have been the variables that made repeal of the Eighteenth
Amendment possible.
Certain state constitutional amendments prohibiting interracial marriage are
also potentially illustrative of the difficulty of repeal. For example, despite
presumably wide popular support for its repeal in recent years, Alabama did not
repeal its constitutional ban on miscegenation until 2000. Elizabeth Becker et al.,
The 2000 Elections: State-by-State: South, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2000, at B15. Similarly,
South Carolina’s ban was repealed in 1998. South Carolina Removes Ban on Interracial
Marriage, CNN.COM, Nov. 3, 1998, http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/
1998/11/03/election/ballots/interracial.marriage/index.html.
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abandoning the statutory canon, a judge would not be “activist,” at
least to the extent “activist” is defined as countermajoritarian; rather,
by abandoning the canon of construction and nullifying the marriage
amendment, the judge would be restoring to the constitution its
rightful claim to authority as recognized by the ultimate rule of
recognition. The judge would be doing what the formal amendment
process may be impotent to accomplish, nominally laying to rest a
marriage amendment that has for all intents and purposes already
been amended out of the constitution by popular opinion.
CONCLUSION
When judges consider constitutional challenges to same-sex
marriage bans (or challenges to the denial of marriage benefits), they
have interpretive choices to make. In those cases in which there is a
late and specific constitutional marriage amendment and an earlier
and more general equal protection or privacy provision, judges might
elect to decide those cases under the marriage amendment, following
the traditional canon of construction that later and more specific
provisions govern over earlier and more general provisions. And, as I
have suggested, there are other legitimate interpretive moves as well.
There may be persuasive reasons for abandoning the canon of
construction when considering the relationship between a marriage
amendment and an equal protection or privacy provision. First, the
Supreme Court, in its Twenty-first Amendment cases, advocated a
balancing of constitutional interests rather than a mechanical
application of the canon.
And wrestling with the various
constitutional interests at stake in its Twenty-first Amendment cases,
the Court greatly restricted the operation of Section 2, the later and
more specific provision dealing with the transportation and
importation of liquor. Second, there are theoretical difficulties with
locating certain kinds of constitutional provisions in time, thus calling
into question the possibility of coherently applying the statutory
canon in the marriage context.
Going forward, as both sexual norms and attitudes about lesbian
and gay families change over time, courts may well be advised, in the
interest of not undermining constitutional legitimacy, to balance the
constitutional interests at stake rather than simply assuming that the
canon of construction provides the exclusive avenue of
interpretation. Whatever the interpretive outcome, however, we do
well to recognize the range of available interpretive choices. Simply
assuming, without any discussion at all, that marriage amendments
remove the marriage question from the ambit of equal protection
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and privacy provisions, makes too easy work of a far more
complicated question. The mechanical application of the canon may
provide the feeling of distance from the constitutional interests at
stake, but as Justice Frankfurter recognized, ultimately, the “canons
of construction [cannot] save us from the anguish of judgment. Such
canons give an air of abstract intellectual compulsion to what is in
fact a delicate judgment, concluding a complicated process of
122
balancing subtle and elusive elements.”

122

Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV.
527, 535 (1947).

